Mobile security
Deep links, application boundaries, browser handoffs, and platform behavior that only becomes dangerous when several valid decisions are chained together.
Start here, then go deeper.
Follow the route from verified links into platform metadata, serialized identity, and privileged consumer decisions.
- 01MobileAndroid App Links: The Link Was Verified. The Action Was Not.18 min ↗
A field methodology for Android App Links that separates domain ownership, route validation, application state, and server-side authorization before calling a deep link secure.
- 02Android identityCVE-2024-0044: How Installer Metadata Forged an Android App Identity13 min ↗
A reader-first variant analysis of Android CVE-2024-0044: how a crafted installer name could corrupt packages.list, mislead run-as, and why the first fix needed a follow-up.
- 03Platform CVECVE-2025-24201: How Web Content Reached an Unneeded GPU StateRead ↗
Every matching record.
Methods and named-vulnerability research remain visually and editorially separate.
Field notes 2
The Extension Was Sandboxed. The Shared Container Still Crossed the Boundary.
An iOS app and its extensions run in separate containers, but App Groups and Keychain access groups deliberately reconnect them. A defensible review follows each entitlement, producer, shared object, lifecycle transition, and privileged consumer instead of treating code signing as authorization.
16 min read ↗Pentest · Feb 26, 2026Android App Links: The Link Was Verified. The Action Was Not.
A field methodology for Android App Links that separates domain ownership, route validation, application state, and server-side authorization before calling a deep link secure.
18 min read ↗